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INTRODUCTION
Millions of people depend on marine fisheries for food and livelihoods. Unfortunately, global
marine fisheries are severely degraded. The latest estimates from the Food and Agriculture
Organization indicate that nearly 30% of assessed fish stocks are overfished (FAO, 2014).
Overfishing threatens food security and livelihoods. Its negative effects go beyond the exploitation
of fish stocks, and affect entire food webs and ecosystems (Scheffer et al., 2005).
Overfishing is exacerbated by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. For example,
illegal fishing is estimated to represent approximately 20% of the world’s reported catch (Agnew
et al., 2009). IUU fishing endangers the productivity of ecosystems, and the socio-economic
stability of fishing communities. Piracy off the Somali coast, for instance, is thought to have started
when Somali fishermen began seizing boats that were fishing illegally in their waters (Bahadur,
2011). Fisheries overexploitation leads to vicious cycles that generate progressive environmental
degradation and social conflict when people attempt to maintain or increase their catches as the
yields of previous fishing methods decline (Brashares et al., 2014). It is therefore in the best interests
of coastal states to prevent IUU fishing, but the capacity to do this is generally low, particularly in
developing coastal states which are the most vulnerable to IUU fishing.
Regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) can play a decisive role in supporting
coastal states to combat illegal fishing. RFMOs are institutions formed by countries with interests
in fisheries within particular regions. RFMOs can play advisory or legally binding managerial
roles. RFMOs integrate management across a number of countries, and are thus advantageous
for managing highly mobile species, because their agreements and actions apply to all member
states. Therefore, countries might be more likely to participate in multilateral agreements because
there are shared costs and opportunities across countries, compared to implementing actions as
single countries (FAO, 2002). Accordingly, RFMOs have a broad spectrum of tools for addressing
IUU fishing, many of which are outlined in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate IUU Fishing (FAO, 2001) and its implementation guidelines (FAO, 2002). An
applicable and valuable tool for combatting IUU fishing is the collection, analysis, and sharing
of information about fishing vessels and their operations, inside and outside economic exclusive
zones. Examples of this are the use of satellite data by initiatives such Global Fishing Watch
and Project Eyes on the Sea. We present a case where RFMO and government information was
obtained and used by a nongovernment organization (NGO) to discover possibly serious instances
of illegal fishing that had not been detected by the RFMO or the government themselves. The case
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highlights the importance of openly available information and
the need for political will—thus far not apparent—to act on IUU
fishing when it is detected.
THE CASE
The Costa Rican Fishing Federation, a NGO, published a report
(Cubero-Pardo and Martínez-Cascante, 2013) that revealed
probable noncompliance by foreign purse seiners within Costa
Rica’s exclusive economic zone. In this case, the apparent illegal
fishing included: (1) the use of artificial fish aggregating devices
(hereafter FADs), illegal in Costa Rica since 1999 (INCOPESCA,
1999), and (2) fishing without a license. More explicitly, the
report stated that nearly 800 sets were on FADs between 2002 and
2011. Furthermore, the report estimated the extent of unlicensed
fishing: 14 to 38 foreign purse seine vessels were recorded as
fishing without a license each year between 2008 and 2011. Below
we describe how the case unfolded.
The data used for these analyses came from the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), an RFMO of
which Costa Rica is a member, and the Costa Rican government.
The Costa Rican Fishing Federation wanted to analyze national
and regional fisheries data and, given the lack of open access
to regional fisheries data, the Federation petitioned these data
from the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. In
the absence of shared databases, the Ministry had to petition
the regional fisheries data from the IATTC, and then handed it
to the Federation (Cubero-Pardo and Martínez-Cascante, 2013).
Figure 1A describes the flow of data and information.
The IATTC data contained information about purse seine
sets, reported in geographic coordinates and stating the type
of set (e.g., FAD, dolphin associated). The IATTC data did
not include an identifier for each vessel, but it included the
vessels’ hold capacities. Cubero-Pardo and Martínez-Cascante
(2013) estimated the number of vessels that fished in Costa
Rica’s exclusive economic zone using hold capacities, which are
distinctive to individual vessels. Hence, the estimate of vessels
that operated without a license was a comparison of the total
number of vessels that had a fishing license (national data
provided by the Costa Rican government) vs. the total number
of vessels they estimated fished in Costa Rica (IATTC data).
The assertion by the Costa Rican Fishing Federation that FADs
were used illegally seems well substantiated because the IATTC
database explicitly mentioned their use, and sets were reported
using geographic coordinates, not grids. There is less certainty
regarding unlicensed fishing because the IATTC database did not
identify vessels by name or number. However, the estimate of
vessels that fished in Costa Rican waters without a license each
year from 2008 to 2011 (i.e., 13 to 38) is large, and probably
includes vessels that indeed fished without a license. Additionally,
claims have been made that purse seiners in Costa Rica have used
explosives during fishing activities (Staley, 2012), and harassed
sport fishing boats to drive them off schools of tuna (McDonald,
2010).
Interestingly, the unlicensed tuna purse seining and the illegal
use of FADs appear to have been reported indirectly to the IATTC
in the form of fisheries data collected by scientific observers
but, until recently, went undetected as possible noncompliance.
Hence, mechanisms seem to be lacking to detect and report IUU
fishing within national and regional fisheries databases. Costa
Rican authorities are aware of the report by the Costa Rican
Fishing Federation. However, numerous gaps still exist: (1) the
results of the report are not widely known, (2) the report did not
recommend broader implications for combatting IUU fishing,
and (3) the results are still pending action on behalf of the
authorities.
The possible cases of illegal fishing described above remain
unverified by the Costa Rican government, and have not been
reported to the IATTC by the government. If the information
in the NGO report is correct, there are serious implications,
including overexploitation, reduction of revenue to the state and
legitimate fishers, and potential damage to the credibility of the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program
(“dolphin safe” tuna certification) in the eyes of consumers. The
suspects remain unidentified; however, the fishing and licensing
data required to corroborate these alleged cases of illegal fishing,
and identify suspect vessels, exist and could be analyzed easily.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR
COMBATTING IUU FISHING
If accurate, these suspected cases of illegal fishing imply a lack of
mechanisms to detect, communicate, and act upon incursions.
Had the data not been analyzed by the Costa Rican Fishing
Federation, the cases presented above, although unconfirmed,
would probably have gone undetected. The detection and
enforcement of illegal fishing within an economic exclusive
zone is the coastal state’s responsibility, in this case Costa
Rica’s. However, RFMOs can also monitor IUU activities and
report to member countries. Costa Rica does not yet have a
national observer program for purse seiners, so the information
was most likely reported by IATTC scientific observers, and it
is not clear whether observers and captains were aware that
the alleged actions were illegal. Regardless of where the data
originated, it is clear that a simple system could detect this type of
reported noncompliance. By combining state and RFMO data in
a single database, it would be possible to alert authorities about
noncompliance. For example, if countries provided licensing
information to an RFMO database, a system alert could
result from an unlicensed boat fishing in a particular country.
Alternatively, if the RFMO database includes FAD regulations
for each member country, the system alert would be triggered
by illegal use of FADs when the data were entered. Having an
effective database system in place to detect and communicate
irregularities is essential for managing compliance. In this case
the data were available but apparently went undetected in
national and RFMO databases. Now, with potential evidence of
large-scale illegal fishing, Costa Rica has yet to react: first, by
verifying these cases, and second, by acting on noncompliance
if the NGO report is accurate.
The case we present here shows how information is crucial
to combat IUU fishing; however, mechanisms need to be in
place to collect, monitor, analyze, and share these data. Simple
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 13
Arias and Pressey Combatting IUU Fishing with Information
FIGURE 1 | Flows of data to detect and deter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. (A) The petitions for and supply of data described in the main text
and summarized here. Given the lack of open access to fishery databases, the Costa Rican Fishing Federation, a non-government organization (NGO), petitioned
regional fisheries data from the Costa Rican Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, a national institution. Again, given the lack of shared databases, the Ministry asked
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO), for the regional data, received them, and then passed them to
the NGO. The NGO analyzed the data and reported the potential cases of illegal fishing to the Ministry. However, the Ministry did not communicate the potential cases
of illegal fishing back to the RFMO, and did not take action concerning the cases. (B) Preferable flow of data and information between RFMOs, national institutions,
and the public (including NGOs, academia and civil society). Gray arrows in (A) represent deficient channels for sharing data (P indicates petition for data, S indicates
supply of data, R indicates reporting on analyzed data). Solid arrows in (B) represent the idealized situation of formal and automatic channels for sharing data.
systems can be used in RFMO and country databases to allow the
detection and communication of noncompliance. Importantly,
public access to national and regional fisheries data, combined
with formal and automated communication channels between
RFMOs, national institutions, and the public (e.g., NGOs,
academia, and civil society), would offer more transparency and
ease the detection of noncompliance (Figure 1B).
A CALL FOR ACTION
We make a call for relevant authorities, particularly the
Costa Rican government, to act upon this case. Such action
would be timely; Costa Rica recently became party to the
FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate IUU Fishing (Asamblea Legislativa., 2015), and
other countries in the region are expected to do likewise
(OSPESCA, 2015). This international agreement seeks to block
IUU vessels and their catch from entering ports and markets
through minimum inspection standards and information-
sharing between countries. Implementation and compliance
with this and other international agreements, such as the
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement (of which Costa Rica is
party), requires cooperation and information-sharing between
countries, RFMOs and the public (Figure 1B). Finally, we
encourage others to analyze existing databases, national and
regional, to look for signs of IUU fishing such as the ones we
described here.
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